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Introduction: Sequence-based typing of hepatitis 
A virus (HAV) is important for outbreak detection, 
investigation and surveillance. In 2013, sequencing 
was central to resolving a large European Union (EU)-
wide outbreak related to frozen berries. However, as 
the sequenced HAV genome regions were only partly 
comparable between countries, results were not 
always conclusive. Aim: The objective was to gather 
information on HAV surveillance and sequencing in 
EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries to find 
ways to harmonise their procedures, for improve-
ment of cross-border outbreak responses. Methods: 
In 2014, the European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on HAV sur-
veillance practices in EU/EEA countries. The survey 
enquired whether a referral system for confirming 
primary diagnostics of hepatitis A existed as well as 
a central collection/storage of hepatitis A cases’ sam-
ples for typing. Questions on HAV sequencing proce-
dures were also asked. Based on the results, an expert 
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consultation proposed harmonised procedures for 
cross-border outbreak response, in particular regard-
ing sequencing. In 2016, a follow-up survey assessed 
uptake of suggested methods. Results: Of 31 EU/
EEA countries, 23 (2014) and 27 (2016) participated. 
Numbers of countries with central collection and stor-
age of HAV positive samples and of those perform-
ing sequencing increased from 12 to 15 and 12 to 14 
respectively in 2016, with all countries typing an over-
lapping fragment of 218 nt. However, variation existed 
in the sequenced genomic regions and their lengths.
Conclusions: While HAV sequences in EU/EEA countries 
are comparable for surveillance, collaboration in shar-
ing and comparing these can be further strengthened.
Introduction
The hepatitis A virus (HAV) of the Picornaviridae family 
affects 114 million people annually and is a common 
cause of food-borne infections worldwide [1,2]. It is 
mainly transmitted through faecal-oral route via per-
son-to-person contact or contaminated food and water 
[3]. Symptoms range from fever, nausea, diarrhoea, 
abdominal pain and jaundice to acute liver failure. In 
children however, the majority of HAV infections are 
subclinical and asymptomatic [4].
Hepatitis A is a notifiable disease in all countries of the 
European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) [5]. 
Most EU/EEA countries, with the exception of few east-
ern EU countries, have experienced hepatitis A notifi-
cation rates below two cases per 100,000 population 
in the last two decades or more [6]. Consequently, and 
based on World Health Organization (WHO) classifica-
tion, the HAV endemicity is currently low or very low 
with a resulting high population susceptibility [1,7]. 
In line with WHO guidance, in most EU/EEA countries 
with low or very low endemicity, hepatitis A vaccina-
tion is recommended only to individuals at increased 
risk of infection, including travellers to endemic coun-
tries, people who inject drugs (PWID) and men who 
have sex with men (MSM). However, due to subopti-
mal vaccination uptakes, travel to countries with high 
or intermediate HAV endemicity is a common risk fac-
tor for infection [8] and multi-country outbreaks have 
been reported since 2012 among MSM and PWID 
[9,10]. Starting 2016, a large outbreak disproportion-
ally affecting MSM was identified in Europe [11-13]. 
Between June 2016 and May 2017, ca 1,400 hepatitis 
A cases in 16 EU/EEA countries were identified, with 
genome sequencing showing concomitant circulation 
of three genetically distinct HAV strains [14,15]. In the 
same period, several other HAV outbreaks affecting 
MSM were reported from the United States, Israel and 
Chile [16]. In recently published studies, sequencing 
demonstrated a link between the cases in Israel and 
Chile and the ongoing EU outbreak [17,18]. Also a large 
food-borne outbreak caused by berries was reported in 
the EU/EEA in 2013–14, with sequencing being key in 
identifying the vehicle of infection [19,20].
Sequence-based typing together with conventional epi-
demiological methods play a crucial role in outbreak 
investigations by confirming or refuting transmission 
chains, monitoring circulating strains and documenting 
introduction of new strains [20]. The combined molecu-
lar and epidemiological methods provide important 
information for action, allowing rapid implementation 
of public health measures such as vaccination of risk 
groups or identification of contaminated vehicles of 
infection, which can be traced back and forward and, 
when these are commercialised, taken off the market to 
avoid new infections. To respond to multi-country hep-
atitis A outbreaks, similar sequencing methods (same 
amplified target region, including length, for sequenc-
ing and phylogenetic analysis) and collaborations and 
exchange of HAV sequence information between EU/
EEA countries offer substantial benefits. This was 
demonstrated during the large 2013–14 EU-wide out-
break related to frozen berries, although sequencing 
results were not always comparable as different ampli-
fied regions of the HAV genome were used for typing in 
some of the countries [19,20].
The HAV genome consists of linear positive single-
stranded RNA and has a single open reading frame 
(ORF) divided into three functional regions, P1–P3. P1 
encodes the capsid polypeptides (viral protein VP1–4) 
and P2 and P3 encode the non-structural polypro-
teins 2A–2C and 3A–3D required for virus replication. 
Only one single serotype has been described but six 
HAV genotypes are defined. The genotypes differ by 
15–25% in the nt sequence of the VP1/2A region and 
are further divided into subtypes (7.0–7.5% difference). 
Subtypes A and B of genotype I, II and III are infectious 
for humans [21-24]. In Europe, subgenotype IA is the 
most predominant subgenotype [25]. The presence of 
only one known serotype can partially be explained 
by the low mutation rate of HAV and the low variability 
resulting in a well-conserved polyprotein [26].
After the large 2013–14 berry-related EU-wide out-
break, the recognition of the importance of sequencing 
in terms of outbreak investigations and preparedness 
led ECDC to convene in October 2014 a multidisci-
plinary expert meeting. The aim was to discuss the 
need for agreement on a common genomic region 
for sequencing and/or the possible use of a protocol 
that HAVNET, a global network of hepatitis A labora-
tories for sharing molecular and epidemiological data 
on hepatitis A cases [27], had developed. In prepara-
tion of this meeting, ECDC performed a survey among 
the EU/EEA countries in order to collect information 
on HAV genotyping practices, including whether pri-
mary diagnostic samples of patients with hepatitis A 
could be referred for confirmation or genotyping and 
whether such samples were centrally collected. The 
survey also aimed to identify the most suitable com-
mon target region for sequencing, and the existence of 
collaborations between the public health sector with 
HAVNET and with the food sector. Based on the find-
ings of this first survey, it was agreed to recommend 
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the sequencing of a common consensus sequencing 
region, spanning the HAV VP1/2A junction, and thus 
promoting the sequence target region described in the 
HAVNET protocol [27]. In 2016, ECDC followed-up with 
a second survey to assess change in sequencing and 
some of the surveillance practices over time. Our study 
describes the analysis of the results from these surveys 
and assesses the progress made between 2014 and 
2016 in harmonisation of HAV typing practices.
Methods
Questionnaires
In September 2014, ECDC performed a rapid consulta-
tion among the 31 EU/EEA countries to mainly collect 
information on HAV genotyping practices through the 
National Focal Points for food- and waterborne diseases 
and zoonoses (Supplement 1). The results of this first 
online survey were discussed in the multidisciplinary 
HAV expert consultation meeting at ECDC in October 
2014, where it was agreed to recommend a common 
consensus sequencing region and/or a standard proto-
col for HAV sequencing as proposed by HAVNET [27]. 
HAVNET provides a laboratory protocol for the detec-
tion and sequencing of HAV, which includes instruc-
tions on RNA extraction, PCR settings, primers for the 
amplification of the VP1/2A junction, and reagents that 
can be used. In August 2016, ECDC distributed a follow-
up questionnaire (Supplement 2) to assess if practices 
had changed or had become more compatible between 
countries.
The responses to both questionnaires were requested 
by October 2014 and October 2016, respectively.
Both surveys focused on laboratory methods used at 
the national level for sequence-based typing of HAV. In 
2014, the sequence target region for typing and/or the 
protocol used for sequencing were queried. Although 
these were not initially investigated by the 2016 sur-
vey, several countries nonetheless provided informa-
tion about their sequencing protocol or sequence target 
region. To complete knowledge on this, countries that 
had not covered this topic were contacted via email 
after the deadline of the 2016 survey.
The surveys also included questions about molecular 
surveillance practices related to sequence-based typ-
ing. These questions aimed at gaining knowledge on 
the central collection and storage of diagnostic sam-
ples of patients fulfilling the EU hepatitis A case defi-
nition (IgM or HAV RNA positive, with clinical criteria 
of an acute hepatitis) [28], and on the presence of a 
referral system for confirmation of primary diagnos-
tics or for characterisation by sequencing (e.g. geno-
typing). Furthermore, countries were asked about 
their sequencing sampling strategy during outbreak 
situations.
Further questions in both surveys were on collabora-
tions with the food sector on comparing sequences 
obtained from humans and/or food samples (food 
safety authorities and reference laboratories for food) 
and on collaborations with HAVNET in depositing and/
or comparing data in the HAVNET database.
Figure 1
Overview of responses to surveyed questions by country, 
2014 and 2016
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Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Cyprus
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
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Netherlands
Norway
Poland
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Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
(PHE)
Total ‘Yes’ 12 15 12 14 15 17 10 13 12 15
Yes
No
N/A
PHE: Public Health England; UK: United Kingdom.
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Table
Central sample collection and place of storage, presence of a referral system for hepatitis A virus by country, European 
Union/European Economic Area, 2014 (n = 23 countries providing information) and 2016 (n = 27 countries providing 
information)
Countries
Central sample collection and place of storage Presence of a referral system
2014 (n = 12/23) 2016 (n = 15/27) 2014 (n = 12/23) 2016 (n = 14/27)
Austria No
National reference laboratory at the 
Center for Virology, Medical University of 
Vienna, Vienna
No Yes, mandatory
Belgium No No No No
Bulgaria
National reference laboratory at the 
National Centre of Infectious and 
Parasitic Diseases, Sofia
National reference laboratory at the 
National Centre of Infectious and Parasitic 
Diseases, Sofia
No Yes, voluntary
Croatia NA University Hospital for Infectious Diseases, Zagreba NA No
Czech Republic NA No NA No
Denmark
Virus Surveillance and Research 
section at Statens Serum Institute, 
Copenhagen
Virus Surveillance and Research section 
at Statens Serum Institute, Copenhagen Yes, voluntary Yes, voluntary
Estonia No No No No
Finland National Institute of Health and Welfare, Helsinki
National Institute of Health and Welfare, 
Helsinki No No
France No No
Yes, voluntary but mandatory during 
outbreaks/detection of clusters (2014 
and 2016)
Germany No No Yes, voluntary Yes, voluntary
Greece No No No No
Hungary National Public Health Institute, Budapest National Public Health Institute, Budapest No No
Iceland
Department of Virology, Landspitali 
- National University Hospital, 
Reykjavik
Department of Virology, Landspitali - 
National University Hospital, Reykjavik No No
Ireland No No Yes, voluntary Yes, voluntary
Italy National Reference Laboratory of the Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Rome
National Reference Laboratory of the 
Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Rome Yes, voluntary Yes, voluntary
Latvia No No Yes, voluntary No
Lithuania No No No No
Malta No No No No
Netherlands National public health institute, Bilthoven National public health institute, Bilthoven Yes, voluntary Yes, voluntary
Norway Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo Yes, mandatory Yes, mandatory
Portugal The National Institute of Health, Lisbon The National Institute of Health, Lisbon Yes, voluntary Yes, voluntary
Romania NA No NA No
Slovakia NA No NA No
Slovenia No
Institute of Microbiology and 
Immunology, Faculty of Medicine, 
University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana
No Yes, voluntary
Spain National Center of Microbiology, Institute of Health Carlos III, Madrid
National Center of Microbiology, Institute 
of Health Carlos III, Madrid Yes, voluntary Yes, voluntary
Sweden
Public Health Agency of Sweden 
(PHAS), Solnaa and/or Sahlgrenska 
hospital, Gothenburga
Public Health Agency of Sweden (PHAS), 
Solnaa and/or Sahlgrenska hospital, 
Gothenburga
Yes, voluntary Yes, voluntary
United Kingdom 
(PHE)
Virus Reference Department, PHE, 
Colindale
Virus Reference Department, PHE, 
Colindale Yes, voluntary Yes, voluntary
NA: data not available; PHE: Public Health England.
a Only those samples that were also tested there by primary diagnostic or sequencing.
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In the 2016 survey, additional information was col-
lected on the timeliness of sequence submission to 
HAVNET in 2015.
Ethical statement
Ethical approval was not necessary for this study.
Data analysis
Counts and proportions of country responses to survey 
questions were calculated using Excel. Maps were gen-
erated using ECDC Map Maker (EMMa) [29]. Alignments 
of the amplified regions of the HAV genome were done 
using CLC Genomics and the complete HAV genome 
sequence (GenBank accession number: NC_001489) 
was used as reference. A schematic representation of 
the alignment was drawn using PowerPoint.
We present a descriptive analysis of the responses to 
the surveys and compare the sequence-based typing 
practices for HAV reported by EU/EEA countries in 2014 
and 2016.
Results
Survey participation
In 2014, 23 of 31 EU/EEA countries (74%) responded 
to the survey. In 2016, four more countries (Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia) replied to the 
survey (27/31) resulting in a participation of 87%. In 
both years, replies for the United Kingdom (UK) were 
provided by Public Health England and related to the 
practices ongoing in England, Northern Ireland and 
Wales. An overview of the countries participating in 
the surveys and procedural changes implemented over 
time is represented in Figure 1, with a total of 13 such 
changes visible.
Sample collection, storage and referral system
In 2014, 12 of 23 countries indicated central collection 
and storage of their samples defined as HAV positive 
by primary diagnostics and intended for sequencing, 
mostly at national level. Twelve countries had a referral 
system for the confirmation of the primary diagnostics 
or for characterisation by sequencing which was volun-
tary in 10 and mandatory in two countries (one in out-
break situation only).
The number of countries with central collection and 
storage of HAV positive samples was 15 in 2016, 
whereas the number of countries with a referral system 
for confirmation of samples increased by two (n = 14) 
compared to 2014. Eleven countries reported a volun-
tary and three a mandatory system (one in outbreak 
situation only).
Austria and Slovenia reported no central collection and 
storage of HAV positive samples in 2014 but did so by 
the time of the second survey in 2016, as did Croatia, 
which had not participated in the 2014 survey. Austria, 
Bulgaria and Slovenia did not have a referral system in 
2014 but all three countries established one by 2016. 
In contrast, Latvia had a referral system in 2014 with 
Figure 2
European Union/European Economic Area countries performing sequence-based typing of hepatitis A virus in (A) 2014 
(n = 23 countries providing information) and (B) 2016 (n = 27 countries providing information)
A. 2014 B. 2016
Yes (n = 15)
No (n = 8)
Data not available (n = 8)
Yes (n = 17)
No (n = 10)
Data not available (n = 4)
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voluntary reporting but it was not the case any longer 
in 2016. In most countries, the national reference lab-
oratories have a supporting role offering laboratory 
diagnostics or genotyping on request (e.g. Germany, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain). In France, refer-
ral to the reference laboratory is mandatory only when 
clusters of cases or outbreaks are identified (Table).
Sequencing practices in European Union/
European Economic Area countries
More than half of the EU/EEA countries performed 
sequence-based typing (15/23 in 2014 and 17/27 in 
2016) at their reference laboratory or collaborating 
centre (Figure 2A and B). Latvia performed sequenc-
ing in 2014 but stopped it by 2016. While no informa-
tion was obtained for the Czech Republic in 2014, it 
was confirmed during the second survey in 2016 that 
sequencing had been implemented in this country after 
2014. Thus a total of three countries (Belgium, the 
Czech Republic and Portugal) started sequence-based 
typing after 2014. Of eastern EU/EEA countries, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary reported having capacity 
for sequencing and its implementation.
The sequenced genome regions and their length are 
shown in Figure 3. All of the responding EU/EEA coun-
tries (n = 15/15 in 2014 and n = 17/17 in 2016) sequence 
the VP1/2A junction but the sequence length varies, 
with a minimum overlap of 218 nt for both years. Three 
countries (Denmark, Norway; Sweden before 2016) 
sequence the 5’ end of VP1 in addition to the VP1/2A 
junction. One country (Spain) used the VP1 and VP2 
Figure 3
Hepatitis A virus genome and targets used for sequence-based typing, European Union/European Economic Area countries, 
2014 (n = 15 countries providing information) and 2016 (n = 17 countries providing information)
Austria
Italy
Latvia
Netherlands
VP4
3A 3B2C 3C 3D
5’ UTR 3’ UTR
P1 P2
Structural proteins Non-structural proteins
0.0 1.0 0.50.40.2 0.3 6.0 7.0
7.5 kb
VP3 VP1 2A
Slovenia (353 bp)
Norway (442 bp)
HAVNet (460 bp)
Norway (446 bp)
1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 4.32.30.36.2 8.2 3.6 kb
VP2
1.41.21.0
Spain (2,122 bp)
France (467bp)
Denmark (1,224 bp) 
Sweden (692 bp )
P3
Sweden (1,125 bp)
Germany, Ireland (349 bp)
Finland, Hungary (218 bp)
2014
2016
Austria
Czech Republic
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Slovenia (353 bp)
HAVNet (460 bp)
Norway (446 bp)
France (467bp)
Denmark (1,224 bp)
Germany, Ireland, Belgiuma (349 bp)
Finland, Hungary (218 bp)
Norway (442 bp)
 United Kingdom (PHE) (505 bp)
 United Kingdom (PHE) (505 bp)
2B2AVP2 VP3 VP1
bp: base pair; kb: kilo bases; PHE: Public Health England; ssRNA: single stranded RNA; UTR: untranslated region; VP: viral protein.
a Belgium changed the region of the genome targeted for amplification/sequencing after 2016 and now uses the HAVNET protocol.
The ( + ) ssRNA (7.5 kb) consists of three open reading frames (P1–P3) encoding structural (P1) and non-structural proteins (P2, P3). P1 encodes 
the capsid polypeptides (VP1–4), and the P2 and P3 regions encode the non-structural polypeptides required for virus replication. The 
horizontal bars represent the position in the genome of the region amplified and sequenced by the respective countries in 2014 and 
2016. The sizes of the respective regions after removing primer binding sites are indicated in parentheses next to the horizontal bars. The 
GenBank sequence NC_001489 (HAV, complete genome) was used as reference.
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region in addition to VP1/2A for amplification before 
2016. Four countries used the HAVNET protocol in 2014 
and the numbers increased to six in 2016.
Collaborations with the food sector and 
HAVNET
Ten of 23 countries reported collaborations with the 
food sector for comparing sequences in 2014 and 13 of 
27 in 2016. Portugal and Slovenia started to collabo-
rate with the food sector after the 2014 survey. Of the 
countries joining the survey in 2016, the Czech Republic 
reported comparing sequences with the food sector 
(Figure 4A and B). Belgium stated that this is not done 
on a routine basis but only for outbreak investigations.
The number of countries reporting collaborations with 
HAVNET increased between the two surveys in 2014 
(n = 12/23) and 2016 (n = 15/27). Latvia reported col-
laboration with HAVNET in 2014, but no longer in 2016. 
Denmark, Finland, Portugal and Spain started collabo-
rating with HAVNET after 2014 (Figure 4C and D).
The majority of the countries reporting collaboration 
with HAVNET in 2016 submitted sequences to the data-
base or used it for comparison of sequences. Of the 
countries submitting sequences, only three indicated 
a regular sequence submission (the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Sweden). The remaining countries only 
submitted in case of outbreak suspicion or on a non-
regular basis (Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Norway, and the UK). Five countries provided an 
answer about the time delay between sequencing and 
submission of results to HAVNET, Sweden stated that 
submission of sequences occurred immediately after 
results were obtained. For the other four replying coun-
tries (Germany, Norway, Portugal, and the UK), the 
time delays differed significantly, ranging from 30 days 
to several years, depending on the country capacities 
and prioritisations.
Discussion
The two surveys performed in 2014 and 2016 provide 
insights into the molecular surveillance and sequenc-
ing practices within the EU/EEA and assess the changes 
introduced following a large food-borne outbreak in 
2013–14. Joint practices such as a common target 
region for sequencing suggested in the ECDC multidis-
ciplinary HAV expert meeting in 2014, allow the com-
parison of results and therefore provide information for 
action. Our analysis identified some progress in this 
respect between 2014 and 2016, with most countries 
reporting positive developments in different aspects of 
sequencing practices. In total, 13 procedural changes 
were observed, indicating an improvement in prepared-
ness and outbreak response capacity in Europe (Figure 
1): the number of countries with a central collection 
and storage of human HAV samples increased, as did 
the countries with a mandatory referral system, those 
performing sequencing, and those collaborating with 
the food sector and HAVNET. According to the replies in 
2014 and 2016, sequence-based typing of HAV samples 
has been implemented in the majority of EU/EAA coun-
tries, except for most eastern EU countries. It is impor-
tant to note that six EU/EEA countries (Croatia, Estonia, 
Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta) report a mean of < 20 
confirmed hepatitis A cases per year in the period 
2014–16, which makes the implementation of sequenc-
ing not a priority for these countries [6]. Only four coun-
tries did not provide information in both surveys.
One of the most important findings is that there is 
capacity for sequencing in the majority of the EU/
EEA countries allowing epidemiologically meaning-
ful comparison of results with all countries perform-
ing sequencing of an overlapping region of the HAV 
genome (Figure 3).
Although reporting of hepatitis A was compulsory in 
all the 23 countries responding to the survey in 2014, 
systematic surveillance of HAV infections could be fur-
ther improved in the majority of EU/EEA countries. The 
absence of a centralised sample collection or a referral 
system (in 12 and 13 countries in 2016, respectively) 
makes it challenging to compare HAV sequences, even 
on the national level.
The crucial role of sequence data analysis to investi-
gate outbreaks and define transmission pathways has 
been demonstrated several times [10,19,30]. With a 
hepatitis A incubation period of about 1 month, it is 
challenging to link apparently sporadic cases and iden-
tify transmission mechanisms and/or vehicles of infec-
tion based only on patients’ interviews. Sequencing 
analysis of HAV isolated from patients supports link-
ing cases, revealing infection routes and identifying 
the vehicle of infection in food-borne outbreaks. In 
2013, Italy was the most affected EU/EEA country in 
a large food-borne hepatitis A outbreak with > 1,200 
reported cases. Sequencing was described as hav-
ing a key role in delineating this outbreak, linking 
cases lacking any epidemiological link and identify-
ing the outbreak strain in the suspected food vehicle. 
Sequencing also revealed the circulation of other unre-
lated strains [20]. Greece performed sequencing during 
a hepatitis A outbreak among refugees, asylum seek-
ers and migrants in 2016, demonstrating that cases 
were imported and not locally acquired [31]. In 2018, 
sequencing revealed a link between cases in Sweden 
and Austria during an HAV outbreak and confirmed 
imported frozen strawberries as the vehicle of infec-
tion in Sweden. Consequently, the strawberries were 
withdrawn from the market, which led to the end of the 
outbreak in Sweden [32]. The importance of a routine 
surveillance system, including prompt referral and typ-
ing of HAV samples, was also highlighted in a Dutch 
study published in 2014 [33]. The authors pointed out 
that large outbreaks are rapidly detected because of 
the large number of patients, but for the detection of 
slowly spreading and dispersed clusters molecular typ-
ing is essential. In addition to providing links between 
cases otherwise not recognised, sequencing helps 
to distinguish sporadic cases from outbreak cases, 
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Figure 4
Collaborations of the European Union/European Economic Area countries with the (A, B) food sector and (C, D) HAVNET 
in 2014 (n = 23 countries providing information) and 2016 (n = 27 countries providing information)
A. Food sector collaborations 2014 B. Food sector collaborations 2016
D. HAVNET collaborations 2016
Yes (n = 10)
No (n = 13)
Data not available (n = 8)
C. HAVNET collaborations 2014
Yes (n = 12)
No (n = 11)
Data not available (n = 8)
Yes (n = 15)
No (n = 12)
Data not available (n = 4)
Yes (n = 13)
No (n = 14)
Data not available (n = 4)
Countries collaborating with the food sector (food safety authorities and reference laboratories for food) on comparing sequences obtained 
from humans and/or food samples (A) in 2014 and (B) 2016 and countries collaborating with HAVNET (global network of hepatitis A 
laboratories for sharing molecular and epidemiological data on hepatitis A - www.havnet.nl) in depositing and/or comparing data in the 
HAVNET database (C) in 2014 and (D) 2016.
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which improves the efficiency of epidemiological stud-
ies, and is essential to verify the end of an outbreak. 
Nevertheless, HAV sequence analysis is most useful to 
support outbreak investigations when applied together 
with relevant associated epidemiological information.
Regarding the genomic region to be sequenced, proto-
cols for HAV sequence-based typing differ within the 
EU/EEA region, with all responding countries sequenc-
ing at least a part of the VP1/2A junction (minimum frag-
ment of 218 nt). The overlapping fragment in the same 
selected genome region allows a minimal comparison 
of different strains between countries. The VP1/2A junc-
tion is known to be one of the most variable regions of 
the HAV genome and therefore allows good resolution 
when comparing sequences. In the early 1990s, the dif-
ferent HAV genotypes were initially defined based on a 
168-nt fragment of the VP1/2A junction [23] but were 
re-classified in the beginning of 2000 based on the 
longer VP1 sequence (900 nt) [34]. Some HAV strains 
differ from each other in > 20% of the nt in the VP1/2A 
region and studies demonstrated a correlation of geno-
type and subgenotype with geographical clustering 
[23,35,36]. Due to the high variability of this region and 
despite the short size (ca 500 nt), genotyping results 
can be obtained and genetic relatedness among HAV 
strains determined [36]. For outbreak investigations, 
analysis of the variable VP1/2A sequence together with 
the epidemiological association is sufficient to follow 
transmission events [37].
In order to achieve more meaningful molecular typ-
ing support for surveillance of hepatitis A in Europe 
and to be able to compare HAV strains circulating in 
different countries, sequencing protocols targeting 
the same region are required. The short target of the 
VP1/2A junction allows easy and fast sequencing at 
lower cost compared with sequencing of larger regions. 
Furthermore, it is the most commonly investigated 
region in outbreaks, allowing the comparison of large 
numbers of previously sequenced strains in public 
databases [20].
Analysis of sequencing data also offers substantial 
benefits for identification of the outbreak vehicle or 
source of infection. Since HAV infections are often 
food-borne, sequencing of food items and collabora-
tions with the food sector are of paramount impor-
tance. Most (13/17) countries performing sequencing in 
2016 indicated collaboration with the food sector and 
comparison of sequences detected in human and food 
samples. Although sequencing from food samples is 
challenging due to the low viral load, inefficient extrac-
tion from different food matrices, the long incubation 
period of hepatitis A (up to 6 weeks) and the resulting 
recall bias of food consumption, it is invaluable in trac-
ing the source of infections and providing evidence for 
public health actions [33,38]. A large part of the eastern 
European countries, which report the majority of the 
hepatitis A cases in the EU, neither perform sequenc-
ing yet, nor have collaborations established with the 
food sector, with consequent limited knowledge of the 
strains circulating in those countries.
HAVNET provides a global database that offers good 
support for outbreak investigations, e.g. comparison 
of strains at national and EU/EEA level. The network 
consists of virologists from universities and public 
health institutes using an online password-protected 
database platform. The use of the database is on a 
‘give-and-take-basis’ and involves the signing of a con-
fidentiality agreement. The platform provides online 
analysis and visualisation tools such as basic local 
alignment search tool (BLAST), phylogeny and a geo-
graphical analysis tool [25]. So far, HAVNET offers the 
only centralised collection of sequencing data and a 
standard protocol for HAV sequencing from human 
samples which additionally enables the comparison 
with HAV strains from food samples. Molecular data 
can be exchanged, strains circulating in different 
countries rapidly identified and therefore outbreak 
responses to multi-country threats improved. Although 
HAVNET provides a useful tool for outbreak investiga-
tions, only 15 countries reported collaborations with 
HAVNET in 2016.
To our knowledge, this is the first time information has 
been systematically gathered on the variety of exist-
ing laboratory practices supporting hepatitis A sur-
veillance within the EU/EEA. Study limitations include 
the survey participation: despite a good participation, 
four countries did not reply to both surveys. Although 
some countries did not have sequencing capacity, they 
reported having access to it or collaborating with other 
countries during hepatitis A outbreaks. Greece, Latvia, 
Luxembourg and Malta performed sequencing in 
2017 in the context of the hepatitis A outbreak mostly 
affecting MSM [15]. In Estonia, samples were referred 
to another laboratory outside the country (National 
Institute for Public Health and the Environment in 
the Netherlands) and Bulgaria sent its samples for 
sequencing to the Istituto Superiore di Sanità in Italy 
for ad hoc scientific collaborations [39]. A further limi-
tation is that the question about the sequencing pro-
tocol was asked in 2014 only and the typing protocol 
may be different nowadays. However, countries had 
the opportunity to indicate changes in their sequenc-
ing practices and for the countries indicating to have 
started sequencing after 2014, additional information 
was collected separately. Spain decided to sequence 
460 nt of the VP1/2A junction (corresponding to the 
HAVNET protocol) instead of complete VP1, VP2 and 2A 
after 2016 due to the high number of cases related to 
the European HAV outbreak disproportionally affect-
ing MSM [15]. Sweden changed its protocol after the 
expert meeting in 2014 to cover the 460 nt fragment 
suggested in the HAVNET protocol plus 232 nt of the 
3’ VP1 region. Belgium replaced its sequencing proto-
col with the HAVNET protocol after 2016. Therefore, the 
results might slightly underestimate the true sequenc-
ing capacity to support hepatitis A surveillance in the 
EU/EEA.
10 www.eurosurveillance.org
In conclusion, the surveys highlighted that many of 
the EU/EEA countries perform sequencing with rather 
variable procedures, but their sequenced regions are 
overlapping and thus comparable for surveillance 
purposes. Nonetheless, European collaboration in 
sharing and comparing HAV sequences on circulating 
strains in a timely manner can be further strengthened. 
Resulting collaborations could contribute significantly 
to accelerate public health responses and thereby 
stop transmission chains across borders and reduce 
the hepatitis A incidence. The population susceptibil-
ity to HAV infection in the EU/EEA has increased due 
to improved hygiene and sanitation that, together with 
the availability of a safe and effective vaccine, result in 
decreased virus circulation. However, hepatitis A sur-
veillance in the EU/EEA is essential since the high pop-
ulation susceptibility in most of the countries, coupled 
with the high population mobility and single food mar-
ket, increase the potential for cross-borders outbreaks. 
HAV sequencing is necessary to ensure the most effi-
cient and timely response to such threats across the 
EU.
The application of whole genome sequencing (WGS) 
has increased within recent years and has become 
the reference molecular typing method in outbreak 
investigations [40]. Applying WGS to the detection of 
pathogens provides several advantages such as fast 
turn-around time and reduction of costs and work-
load. A high discrimination between HAV strains can 
be achieved since WGS allows the detection of minor 
variants. In the coming years, WGS might replace the 
sequencing of the VP1/2A region. In the meantime, 
a higher degree of harmonisation in amplifying the 
VP1/2A region will help to improve preparedness and 
accelerate public health response in Europe.
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